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COMMENTS
PROHIBITING THE DEDUCTION FOR NONCORPORATE TAX DEFICIENCY INTEREST:
WHEN TREASURY GOES TOO FAR
WILLIAM

G. ANDREOZZI*

INTRODUCTION

Delta Foods, Inc. ("Delta") is a hypothetical grocery store.'
Delta is treated as a corporation for federal income tax purposes.!
Unintentionally, Delta computes its taxable income for federal
income tax purposes erroneously. The error results in Delta
underreporting its income on its federal income tax return. The
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) selects Delta for audit. Upon
examination, the IRS discovers the erroneous calculation of
income and assesses additional tax on Delta. In addition to the
tax assessed, the IRS assesses interest on the tax deficiency.'
Delta pays the additional tax and corresponding interest and
thereafter deducts the interest on its tax return without challenge
by the IRS.4 This result is not only permitted, but logical. One
would expect this logical result regardless of the type of business
entity the taxpayer chose to conduct the business. Unfortunately,
not all business taxpayers are graced with the same logical result.
John Smith ("Smith") also operates a hypothetical grocery
store.' However, Smith operates the grocery store as a soleproprietorship.6 After Smith erroneously calculates his business
* J.D. Candidate, January 2002.
1. This is a hypothetical situation used to demonstrate the issues and
problems addressed in this Comment.
2. Delta Foods, Inc. is organized under subchapter C of the Internal
Revenue Code as a taxable corporation. See generally I.R.C. §§ 301-85 (1994)
(illustrating the sections of the Internal Revenue Code that make up
subchapter C).
3. See I.R.C. § 6601(a) (1994) (mandating that interest be assessed on all
underpayments of tax).
4. See I.R.C. § 163(h)(1) (1994) (permitting the deduction of interest by
corporate taxpayers).
See also I.R.C. § 275(a)(1) (1994) (disallowing
deductions by all taxpayers for federal income taxes).
5. This is a hypothetical situation used to demonstrate the issues and
problems addressed in this Comment.
6. A sole-proprietor is an individual taxpayer that conducts a business
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income for federal income tax purposes, he is selected for audit by
the IRS. The IRS proposes adjustments to Smith's business
income that result in additional tax being owed. Additionally,
interest on the tax deficiency is assessed against Smith. Smith,
like Delta, proceeds to deduct the interest on his federal income
tax return as a business expense. However, in a subsequent audit
the IRS disallows Smith's business deduction for the deficiency
interest claiming that it is "personal" interest and not "business"
interest.
Did Congress intend to distinguish between soleproprietors and corporations in the context of tax deficiency
interest, or is this an example of the IRS abusing its power?
Although corporations and sole-proprietorships are treated
differently under most sections of the Internal Revenue Code (the
"Code"), the Code should provide for uniform treatment of

without the benefits and burdens of incorporation or business partners.
WILLIAM P. STRENG, CHOICE OF ENTITY A-4 (700-2nd TAX MGMT. 1999). A
sole-proprietor and his or her business are one and the same. THE ERNST &
YOUNG TAX GUIDE 1999 485 (Peter W. Bernstein, ed., John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
1999). A sole-proprietor is required to report his or her business income and
expenses on Schedule C of Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return. Id.
7. See I.R.C. § 163(h)(1) (1994) (denying a deduction by all taxpayers,
other than corporations, for "personal" interest). Section 163(h) states, in
relevant part:
(h) Disallowance of deduction for personal interest.
(1) In general.
In the case of a taxpayer other than a corporation, no deduction shall
be allowed under this chapter for personal interest paid or accrued
during the taxable year.
(2) Personal interest.
For purposes of this subsection, the term "personal interest" means
any interest allowable as a deduction under this chapter other than(A) interest paid or accrued on indebtedness properly allocable to
a trade or business (other than the trade or business of performing
services as an employee).
I.R.C. § 163(h). See also Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-9T(b)(2)(A) (1999) (defining
"personal interest" to specifically include interest paid by individuals for
underpayments of federal, state, or local income taxes). The result in this
hypothetical, and throughout this Comment, would be the same if Delta
Foods, Inc. were treated as a partnership or subchapter S corporation for
Federal income tax purposes. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-9T(b)(2)(C) (1999)
(including tax deficiency interest paid by individuals in their capacity as
partners in partnerships or shareholders in S corporations within the IRS'
definition of "personal interest"). See also Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1639T(b)(2)(C)(ii) (illustrating that tax deficiency interest paid by an S
corporation shareholder as a result of the corporation underreporting its
income that passed through to the shareholder is nondeductible personal
interest); True v. United States, No. 91-CV-1004-J, 1993 WL 379417 (D. Wyo.
1993), affd, 35 F.3d 574 (10th Cir. 1994) (denying the Trues a deduction for
tax deficiency interest that resulted from the underreporting of income passed
through from family businesses being operated as partnerships and S
corporations).
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deductions for interest assessed on income tax deficiencies. 8 It is,
however, no wonder why the IRS has chosen to treat these two
business forms differently. Over the last twenty-three years, the
number of taxpayers conducting business as sole-proprietors has
grown dramatically.9 This type of business-form discrimination
may be a contributing cause to the American public's perception of
the IRS as an agency that abuses its power.10
Historically, tax deficiency interest assessed on a soleproprietor was considered a business expense and therefore

8. See John Y. Taggart, Denial of the Personal Interest Deduction, 41 TAX

LAW. 195, 198 (1988) (illustrating that deductions for personal interest should
be allowed because they perform an equalization of the financial positions
between those who choose to borrow to engage in personal transactions, and
those who use their own capital, thus foregoing income on that capital). The
result of denying the deduction for personal interest is that the one who
borrows to engage in the personal transaction has higher taxable income than
the one who uses his or her own capital, and thus foregoes the income on that
capital. Id. at n.8. A basic premise for American economic growth is the
ability to deduct interest. Id. at 198.
[The] underlying notion [behind the interest deduction is] that if an
individual or corporation desires to engage in purposive activity, there is
no reason why a taxpayer who borrows for that purpose should fare
worse from an income tax standpoint than one who finances the venture
with capital that otherwise would have been yielding income.
Goldstein v. Comm'r, 364 F.2d 734, 741 (2d Cir. 1966).
9. See Internal Revenue Service, IRS Statistical Overview: Number of
Returns
(last
modified
Oct.
10,
2000)
http://www.irs.gov/tax-stats/soi/othernr.html
(providing
statistical
information regarding the number of federal income tax returns and forms
filed, or to be filed, by type, for calendar years 1975-1999). In 1975, the
number of individuals conducting business as sole-proprietors exceeded the
number of businesses conducted as corporations (Subchapter C corporations
only) by more than four times. Id. In 1998, the number of sole-proprietors
exceeded corporations by almost seven times. Id. Additionally, between 1975
and 1998, the number of individuals conducting business as sole-proprietors
grew by more than 130 percent, while the number of new corporations grew by
only 41 percent. Id.
10. See The Gallup Organization, Public By 3 to 1 Margin Believes IRS
Abuses
Its
Powers
(visited
Oct.
5,
1999)
http:/ / www.gallup.com /poll / releases/pr971003.asp(discussing the American
public's perception that the IRS is too powerful and frequently abuses its
power). Over 70 percent of the American public perceive the IRS as having
more power than it needs, and 69 percent believe the IRS often abuses its
power. Id. It is often said that perception is reality, and when speaking of the
IRS, the American public's perception is reality. The IRS is perhaps the most
powerful governing body in the world. DAVID BURNHAM, A LAW UNTO ITSELF
16 (Random House 1989). With over 120,000 employees, the IRS is the largest
law enforcement agency in the United States. Id. Furthermore, the IRS has
the authority to grant or deny tax-exempt status to various types of
educational, religious, and charitable organizations. Id. at 17. This power
alone is great enough to affect significant aspects of American life including
social, religious, educational, and political activities. Id.
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allowed as a business deduction." However, the Tax Reform Act of
1986 purportedly eliminated this well-defined precedent by
denying individuals a deduction for "personal interest." 2 Congress
defined "personal interest" "negatively" in the statute" and
preserved an exception for the deductibility of "interest paid or
accrued on indebtedness properly allocable to a trade or
business." 4 At first blush the statute seemed clear, however, the
Department of Treasury ("Treasury") later determined that the
statute was unclear and decided to define one type of interest that
it unquestionably considered personal: individual tax deficiency
interest."
Therefore, shortly after Congress enacted the Tax
Reform Act of 1986, Treasury promulgated Temporary Regulation
§ 1.163-9T,' 6 which succinctly stated that personal interest
11. See Melinda L. Reynolds, Redlark v. Comm'r: A "Bird in the Hand"for
Noncorporate Taxpayers?, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 751, 751 (1997) (stating
that prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, individuals could deduct interest on
business-related debt). See generally Keith E. Engel, Deducting Interest on
Federal Income Tax Underpayments: A Roadmap Through a 50-Year
Quagmire, 16 VA. TAX REV. 237, 244-56 (1996) (discussing the history of the
interest deduction for federal income tax purposes). Between 1861 and 1943,
the deductibility of interest was virtually uncontested. Id. at 245. Taxpayers
were entitled to deduct interest regardless of the source of the debt generating
the interest. Id. Between 1944 and 1986, the deduction of deficiency interest
was still intact, with the exception of a minor deviation in 1956. Id. at 244,
247-48. In 1956, the Tax Court held in Maxcy v. Comm'r, that deficiency
interest was personal in nature because it related to the individual taxpayer's
"personal income tax obligations." Maxcy v. Comm'r, 26 T.C. 526 (1956). The
next year, the Tax Court mysteriously changed course. Engel, supra, at 249.
In a series of cases between 1957-1960, the Tax Court allowed sole-proprietors
to deduct deficiency interest as a business expense against the Commissioner's
strong opposition. Id. at 249-51.
12. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 511(b), 100 Stat. 2085,
2246 (1986) (codified at I.R.C. § 163(h) (1994)). "In the case of a taxpayer
other than a corporation, no deduction shall be allowed ... for personal
interest paid or accrued during the taxable year." I.R.C. § 163(h)(1) (1994).
13. See Reynolds, supra note 11, at 751. "Personal interest" is defined
"negatively" in the statute because it is defined in terms of what does not
constitute 'personal interest."
14. I.R.C. § 163(h)(2)(A) (1994).
15. Congress has granted authority to the Secretary of the Treasury to
"prescribe all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement of [Title 26]."
I.R.C. § 7805(a) (1994). It is generally presumed that regulations enacted by
Treasury pursuant to its rulemaking power in section 7805(a) are interpretive.
Michael Asimow, Public Participation in the Adoption of Temporary Tax
Regulations, 44 TAX LAW. 343, 358 (1991). Interpretive rules are intended to
"advise the public of the agency's construction of the statutes and rules it
administers." U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE

ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT 30, n.3 (1947). See, e.g., Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323
U.S. 134, 138 (1944) ('[Interpretive rules] provide a guide... as to how [the
agency] will seek to apply the [the statute]."); Gibson Wine Co. v. Snyder, 194
F.2d 329, 331 (D.C. Cir. 1952) ('[Ilnterpretative rules are statements as to
what the [agency] thinks the statute... means.").
16. T.D. 8168, 1988-1 C.B. 80. Treasury occasionally 'issues [tiemporary
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includes interest paid "on underpayments of individual Federal,
State or local income taxes.""7
This Comment examines the history of the non-corporate tax
deficiency interest deduction and how Treasury uprooted this wellestablished rule. The conclusion is that Temporary Regulation §
1.163-9T should be rendered invalid because it represents an
abuse of Treasury's delegated authority to prescribe necessary
rules. Treasury abused its general rulemaking authority by
enacting a regulation that in effect creates new substantive law,
rather than interpreting existing law. 8 In most circumstances,
new substantive law is subject to public notice and a comment
period under the Administrative Procedure Act. 9 When Treasury
Irlegulations in response to a congressional or judicial change in the tax law."
ET AL., WEST'S FEDERAL TAX RESEARCH 82 (West
Publishing Co., 3rd ed. 1991).
Temporary regulations are effective
immediately. upon publication and must be followed until they are superseded.
Id. Proposed regulations, by contrast, do not carry the force of law, and are
only issued to solicit comments from the public. Id.
17. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-9T(b)(2) (1987).
18. See Kevin W. Saunders, Interpretative Rules With Legislative Effect: An
Analysis and a Proposal for Public Participation,1986 DUKE L.J. 346, 347-48
(1986) (suggesting that Congress may implicitly grant an administrative
agency authority to issue rules and regulations that have the force and effect
of a legislative rule). A legislative rule creates new substantive law in
addition to that contained in the statute. Id. at 346. When Treasury adopts
regulations that create "distinctions, refinements, formulas, or safe harbors,"
arguably it is acting in a legislative capacity. See Asimow, supra note 15, at
360. When Treasury adopts this type of new tax law, the regulation should be
subject to public participation through the Administrative Procedure Act,
"which serves as a surrogate for the protection ordinarily afforded taxpayers
by the legislative process." Id. See also Robert A. Anthony, "Interpretive"
Rules, "Legislative"Rules and "Spurious"Rules: Lifting the Smog, 8 ADMIN.
L.J. AM.U. 1, 10 (1994) (proposing that non-legislative rules that should have
been enacted legislatively be called "spurious rules"). Spurious rules are so
named because interpretive rules, while not having legal effect, are given the
appearance of law by the agency and the courts. Id.
19. The Administrative Procedure Act provides that, with certain
exceptions, the agency proposing to make a rule must provide general notice of
the rule in the Federal Register and give "interested persons an opportunity to
participate in the rule making through submission of written data, views, or
arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation." Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(c) (1994). One such exception to the
Administrative Procedure Act is the "good cause" exemption. Id at § 553(b)(B).
The general notice and comment period required for proposed rules by an
agency of the federal government do not apply "when the agency for good
cause finds.., that notice and public procedure.., are impracticable,
unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest." Id. Professor Juan J. Lavilla
conducted a detailed examination of federal agencies' use of the good cause
exemption in enacting rules and regulations. Juan J. Lavilla, The Good Cause
Exemption to Notice and Comment Rulemaking Requirements Under the
Administrative Procedure Act, 3 ADMIN. L.J. 317, 339 n.86 (1989). Professor
Lavilla observed that more than half the rules promulgated by the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) dispense with public notice and comment period, with
WILLIAM A. RAABE,
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avoids compliance with public notice and comment periods, albeit
through legislative exceptions provided in the Administrative
Procedure Act, they violate the policy of the United States
rulemaking process."
Part I of this Comment provides a historical account of the
relevant cases and legislative actions that are necessary to
understand the nature of the dispute. The historical account of
the dispute is examined within three well-defined periods,21 19571985, 1986-1996, and post-1996. Part II will analyze an argument
raised in the 1986-1996 and post-1996 periods, that the temporary
regulation denying sole-proprietors a deduction for tax deficiency
interest is invalid. Additionally, Part II will include an analysis of
the courts' method of reviewing administrative agency regulations
and a discussion of the differences between interpretive and
legislative regulations.
Finally, Part III will propose an
alternative theory for invalidating Temporary Regulation § 1.1639T. The essence of the theory is that while Temporary Regulation
§ 1.163-9T is termed an interpretive regulation, it is legislative in
effect and therefore, because it was not subject to public notice and
a comment period, it should be held invalid.
I.

AN INTEREST[ING] BACKGROUND

More than eighty years ago, the first modern income tax
statute permitted United States citizens to deduct deficiency
the justification that immediate public guidance is necessary. Id. at 341. The
IRS does not even attempt to provide an explanation of why it is invoking the

exception. Id. Another exception to the public notice and comment period
requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act is for interpretative rules.
5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (1994). Presumably, the IRS used this exception to avoid
issuing a general notice of proposed rulemaking when it enacted Temporary
Regulation § 1.163-9T, although the IRS stated its exception to § 553 was
because it was issuing temporary regulations. See T.D. 8168, 1988-1 C.B. 80,
82. Temporary regulations are also known as interpretive regulations because
they provide taxpayers with immediate guidance on the application of a new
provision of the law. RAABE, supra note 16, at 82. Regulations classified as
temporary are only subject to a post-effective date comment period, whereas
proposed regulations are subject to a pre-effective date comment period.
Asimow, supra, note 15, at 363.
20. See Government in the Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409, § 2, 90 Stat.
1241, 1241 (1976) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552b (1994)) ("It is...
the policy of the United States that the public is entitled to the fullest
practicable information regarding the decisionmaking processes of the Federal
Government.").

21. Other authors addressing the deductibility of non-corporate tax
deficiency interest have chosen to delineate the history of this issue into
similar periods. See, e.g., Reynolds, supra note 11, at 755-66 (discussing the
history of the non-corporate tax deficiency interest deduction in terms of pre1987 case law, post-1986 case law, and finally, the Tax Court's decision in
Redlark); Engel, supra note 11, at 246-62 (analyzing the underpayment
interest deduction dispute during the period 1944-1986 and after 1986).
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interest.22 Over the course of these eighty years, however, the
interest deduction has undergone incessant modifications. 3
This part of the Comment describes the history of the fortyyear dispute over the deficiency interest deduction in terms of
three periods. Section A discusses the first period, which occurred
between 1957-1985. During this period, the United States Tax
Court consistently held that non-corporate tax deficiency interest
was deductible by sole-proprietors as an ordinary and necessary
business expense. 4 Section B discusses the second period of the
dispute, 1986-1996. That period included the enactment of the
Tax Reform Act of 1986, which denied individuals a deduction for
"personal interest," and Temporary Regulation § 1.163-9T, 6 which
defines "personal interest" as individual income tax deficiency
interest. This period concluded with the pivotal decision in
27
Redlark v. Commissioner,
where the Tax Court invalidated
Temporary Regulation § 1. 163-9T insofar as it established a per se
rule of nondeductibility for income tax deficiency interest. Finally,
Section C will examine the present period, which includes the
post-1996 cases. In the post-1996 line of cases, the United States
Tax Court and the Federal appellate courts disagree on the
validity of Temporary Regulation § 1. 163-9T.
A. Emergence of the Conflict: 1957-1986
In 1957, the Tax Court delivered one of the first decisions
22. See JOHN HARLLEE, JR., INTEREST EXPENSE DEDUCTIONS A-1 (536-2nd
TAX MGMT. 1998) (discussing the Revenue Act of 1916 which permitted U.S.
citizens to "unconditionally" deduct interest paid on all forms of indebtedness).
See also Engel, supra note 11, at 244 (noting that "[b]y 1913, Congress allowed
individuals to deduct all forms of interest, including personal interest.").
23. See generally HARLLEE, supra note 22, at A-1 to A-3 (discussing the
voluminous legislative history of the interest deduction). Beginning with the
genesis of the interest deduction in 1916, Congress enacted numerous revenue
acts that modified the interest deduction in various respects. Id.

24. See, e.g., Reise v. Comm'r, 35 T.C. 571 (1961), affd, 299 F.2d 380 (7th
Cir. 1962); Polk v. Comm'r, 31 T.C. 412 (1958), affd, 276 F.2d 601 (10th Cir.
1960); Standing v. Comm'r, 28 T.C. 789 (1957), affd, 259 F.2d 450 (4th Cir.
1958). But see Maxcy v. Comm'r, 26 T.C. 526, 527 (1956) (holding that the
taxpayer could not deduct federal income tax deficiency interest that resulted
solely from the failure to timely file income tax returns).
25. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986). The
Tax Reform Act of 1986 disallowed deductions by individuals for "personal
interest." Id. at 2246. Section 511(b) of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 defined
personal interest, in relevant part, as "interest paid or accrued on
indebtedness incurred or continued in connection with the conduct of a trade
or business (other than a trade or business of performing services as an
employee)." Id.
26. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-9T (1987).
27. Redlark v. Comm'r, 106 T.C. 31, 47 (1996), rev'd, 141 F.3d 936 (9th Cir.
1998) (holding that Temporary Regulation § 1.163-9T was "an impermissible
reading of the statute").
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involving the deductibility of non-corporate tax deficiency interest.
28
In Standing v. Commissioner,
the Tax Court held that the
interest on tax deficiencies arising from an individual's trade or
business was deductible as an "ordinary and necessary" business
expense.29 In Standing, the underlying tax assessment was clearly
related to the taxpayer's lumber business that he operated as a
sole-proprietorship. °
The Tax Court likened tax deficiency
interest incurred in a taxpayer's trade or business to legal
expenses incurred in a taxpayer's trade or business and held that
the two were synonymous."' Therefore, the court held that interest
on the income tax deficiency was properly deductible as an
ordinary and necessary business expense.3"
Soon thereafter, the Tax Court in Polk v. Commissioner,3
relying on its holding in Standing, again held that interest on
income tax deficiencies was deductible as an ordinary and
necessary business expense. 4 It was clear in Polk, as it was in
Standing,that the income tax deficiency arose in connection with
the taxpayer's business.3 ' Consequently, the deficiency interest
must have also arisen in connection with the taxpayer's business.36

28. Standing v. Comm'r, 28 T.C. 789 (1957), affd, 259 F.2d 450 (4th Cir.
1958). James Standing operated a retail lumber and building supply business
as a sole-proprietor. Id. at 789. An IRS examination of the Standings' 19451949 income tax returns resulted in an increase to Mr. Standing's business
income and a corresponding assessment of additional tax and deficiency
interest. Id. at 790. Mr. Standing subsequently claimed a business deduction
on his 1951 individual income tax return for the deficiency interest he paid as
a result of the audit. Id. at 791.
29. Deductions shall be allowed for "[aill the ordinary and necessary
expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or
business." I.R.C. § 162(a) (2000). Deductions shall also be allowed for "[all
interest paid or accrued within the taxable year on indebtedness." I.R.C. §
163(a) (2000).
30. Standing, 28 T.C. at 790 (noting that the revenue agent's report stated
that: "The additional tax is due to an increase in business income.").
31. Id. at 793-94. The court noted: "[Wie are unable to perceive any real
distinction between an expenditure for attorney's fees made to secure payment
of the earnings of the business and a like expenditure to retain such earnings
after their receipt. One is as directly connected with the business as the
other." Id. at 794 (quoting Kornhauser v. United States, 276 U.S. 145, 153
(1928)).
32. Id. at 795.
33. Polk v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 412 (1958), affd, 276 F.2d 601 (10th Cir.
1960). Frank and Marie Polk were engaged in the business of raising and
producing livestock as sole-proprietors. Id. at 414. In 1948, the IRS assessed
additional income tax and deficiency interest as a result of the IRS'
revaluation of the Polk's livestock inventory. Id. In computing their taxable
income for 1952, the Polks deducted the deficiency interest as a business
expense, which generated a net operating loss for that tax year. Id. at 413-14.
34. Id. at 415.
35. Id.
36. Id. But see Commissioner v. Polk, 276 F.2d 601, 602 (10th Cir. 1960),
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In Reise v. Commissioner,37 the Tax Court followed its
reasoning in Standing and Polk and again allowed a business
deduction for deficiency interest. 38 Again, it was clear that the
income tax deficiency arose in connection with the taxpayer's
business,39 and therefore the interest charge on that deficiency
must have "[arisen] in connection with" and been "proximately
related" to the taxpayer's business.4 °
Consequently, until the Tax Reform Act of 1986, it was well
settled that individual taxpayers were permitted to claim a
business deduction for deficiency interest that was attributable to
the individual's trade or business.4 However, the Tax Reform Act
of 1986 made significant changes to the interest deduction, which
led to the present controversy over the deductibility of tax
deficiency interest.4"

affg 31 T.C. 412 (1958) (cautioning that "[ain item of expense is not deductible
as a business expense merely because it arose in connection with the
taxpayer's business and was proximately related thereto."). The affirming
appellate court challenges the Tax Court's comparison of legal fees and
.penalty interest." Id. at 603. Penalty interest "stand[s] in a different light."

Id.
Unless it can be said that the failure to properly evaluate inventories,
which form a part of a taxpayer's return, arises because of the nature of
the business, and is ordinarily and necessarily to be expected, interest
on a deficiency assessment does not arise out of the ordinary operation
of the business and may not be deducted [as a business expense].
Id. (footnote omitted). The reasoning in Polk suggests that even though tax
adjustments arise as a result of adjustments to business income, the real
question is whether the error giving rise to the adjustment is one that is
commonly encountered in that taxpayer's trade or business. See Reynolds,
supra note 11, at n.36 (stating that the level of taxpayer negligence will vary
depending on the particular taxpayer and reviewing court).
37. Reise v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 571 (1961), affd, 299 F.2d 380 (7th Cir.
1962). Elmer Reise, a dealer in hides and skins, conducted his business as a
sole-proprietor. Id. at 572. In 1949, the Wisconsin Department of Revenue
and the IRS conducted examinations of Mr. Reise's individual income tax
returns and disallowed deductions for federal and state deficiency interest. Id.
Mr. Reise erroneously computed his business income on the cash basis of
accounting and created a tax deficiency. Id.
38. Id. at 579.
39. Id. at 572.
40. Id. at 580 (quoting Polk v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 412, 415 (1958)).
41. See Engel, supra note 11, at 256-57 (summarizing the state of the
interest deduction prior to 1969 and from 1969 until the Tax Reform Act of
1986). See also Czar Vigil, Deducting Interest on Non-Corporate Trade or
Business Tax Deficiencies: Redlark v. Commissioner, 50 TAX LAW. 685, 686
(1997) (noting that the courts had consistently permitted the deduction of
deficiency interest arising from business income adjustments prior to the Tax
Reform Act of 1986).
42. See Engel, supra note 11, at 257 (stating that the Tax Reform Act of
1986 permitted the IRS to challenge all interest deductions by individuals and
disallow them as personal).
While interest was generally deductible
regardless of the type of interest involved, it was a significant advantage to
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B. An Interest[ing]Reform: 1986-1996
In 1986, Congress amended the Code and disallowed
deductions for personal interest by individuals. 4 However, the
amended Code retained an exception for the deduction of interest
attributable to a trade or business." Specifically, the deduction for
interest on individual income tax deficiencies arising from
adjustments solely to business income is not addressed in the
statute. 9 In 1987, Treasury attempted to resolve the uncertainty
surrounding the deductibility of deficiency interest by issuing
Temporary Regulation § 1.163-9T.4 6 Temporary Regulation §
1.163-9T clearly states that all interest associated with individual
47
income tax deficiencies is nondeductible personal interest.
Although the IRS now argues that deficiency interest is
nondeductible personal interest rather than a nondeductible
business expense, the controversy continues.48
The first case to address the deficiency interest controversy
after the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 was Miller v.
United States.4 9 The North Dakota District Court followed the
deduct interest as a business expense because it was an "above-the-line"
deduction. Id. at 256. After 1969, Congress began categorizing interest based
on its type: business, investment, or personal. Id. at 257.
43. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 511(b), 100 Stat. 2085,
2246 (1986) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 163(h) (1994)). Congress
amended section 163 by adding subsection (h)(1) which states: "In the case of a
taxpayer other than a corporation, no deduction shall be allowed under this
chapter for personal interest paid or accrued during the taxable year." Id.
44. Id. Section 511(b)(2)(a) of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 excepts from the
definition of personal interest "interest paid or accrued on indebtedness
incurred or continued in connection with the conduct of a trade or business
(other than the trade or business of performing services as an employee)." Id.
Congress subsequently amended section 163(h)(2)(A) by replacing "incurred or
continued in connection with the conduct of" with "properly allocable to."
Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, §
1005(c)(4), 100 Stat. 3342, 3390 (1988).

45. I.R.C. § 163 (1994).
46. Vigil, supra note 41, at 685-86.
47. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-9T(a)(2) (1987). The regulation specifically
states:
(2) Interest relating to taxes-(i) In general. Except as provided in
paragraph (b)(2)(iii) of this section, personal interest includes interest(A) Paid on underpayments of individual Federa, State or local income
taxes and on indebtedness used to pay such taxes (within the meaning
of § 1.168-8T), regardless of the source of the income generating the tax
liability.
Id.
48. See Engel, supra note 11, at 256 (noting that the deficiency interest
deduction controversy still exists even after enactment of the Tax Reform Act
of 1986 and temporary regulations).
49. Miller v. United States, 841 F. Supp. 305 (D.N.D. 1993), related
proceeding, 95-1 U.S.T.C. 50,068, at 87,228 (D.N.D. 1994), affd in result, 65
F.3d 687 (8th Cir. 1995). Miller was a farmer. Id. at 306. As part of an
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"ordinary and necessary" business expense reasoning in the
Standing, Polk, and Reise line of cases and rejected Temporary
Regulation § 1.163-9T." ° The court did not believe that Congress
intended to change the long history of case law supporting a
business deduction for deficiency interest incurred in connection
with the conduct of a trade or business. 51 However, the court left
open for rehearing the question of whether the tax deficiency
interest at issue was of the type that could be deducted as an
ordinary and necessary business expense.52 On rehearing, the
North Dakota District Court determined that the tax deficiency
interest involved was not an ordinary and necessary business
expense and disallowed the deduction." The Eighth Circuit, while
affirming the lower court's decision, did not agree that the
regulation was invalid. 4
The first notable Tax Court case to address the deficiency
interest deduction after enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1986
was Redlark v. Commissioner." As an initial matter, the Tax
income deferral scheme involving a wholly-owned corporation, Miller
underreported his taxable income by approximately $1.5 million. Miller, 95-1
U.S.T.C. at 87,231. Upon review, the IRS assessed additional tax and interest
on the deficiency. Id. Miller subsequently deducted the deficiency interest as
a business expense. Id. Upon IRS challenge, Miller argued that the
underpayment of income tax was an ordinary and necessary business expense,
and therefore deductible. Id. at 87,229.
50. Miller, 841 F. Supp. at 309-10. The court concluded that Temporary
Treasury Regulation § 1.163-9T was "unreasonable and therefore invalid." Id.
at 310.
51. Id. at 310. The court based its decision on I.R.C. § 163(h)(2)(A),
legislative history, case law, and a 1989 tax article. Id. at 309-10. The court
held that as a matter of law, Temporary Regulation § 1.163-9T(b)(2)(A) was an
invalid construction of the term "personal interest." Id. at 310.

52. Miller, 95-1 U.S.T.C. at 87,230.
53. Id. at 87,232. Although the court ultimately denied Miller's deduction
for deficiency interest, it did so because the tax deficiency arose out of an
improper income deferral scheme that could not be construed as ordinary and
necessary in Miller's line of business. Id. "[T]he underlying tax deficiency
must be the result of an error which is typical of, and reasonably anticipated
in, the commercial field in which the taxpayer engages." Id.
54. Miller, 65 F.3d at 691. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with
the district court that the tax deficiency interest was not of the type that
would ordinarily and necessarily be of the type incurred in Miller's trade or
business, but rejected the reasoning that Temporary Regulation § 1.163-9T
was inconsistent with the language of I.R.C. § 163(h). Id. In the court's view,
the per se denial of tax deficiency interest in Temporary Regulation § 1.163-9T
was dispositive of the taxpayer's claimed interest deduction. Id.
55. Redlark v. Commissioner, 106 T.C. 31 (1996) (Ruwe, J. and Halpern, J.,
dissenting), rev'd, 141 F.3d 936 (1997). Redlark was heard by the entire Tax
Court. Id. Both the majority and dissenting opinions each gained the support
of eight judges. Id. Redlark was not the first post-Tax Reform Act of 1986 Tax
Court case to address the deficiency interest controversy. On three previous
occasions, the Tax Court held that the individual taxpayers could not deduct
tax deficiency interest because they could not adduce sufficient proof that the
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Court determined that the deficiency interest was sufficiently
related to the taxpayer's trade or business to be considered
ordinary and necessary.56 The Tax Court next considered the more
critical issue before the court: whether Temporary Regulation §
1.163-9T(b)(2) was a valid interpretation of I.R.C. § 163(h).57 The
Tax Court ultimately held the regulation invalid and that the
deficiency interest at issue was properly allocable to a trade or
business and therefore deductible as a business expense."
However, the Ninth Circuit reached a contrary result and reversed
the Tax Court.59
The Tax Court's decision in Redlark was significant for a
number of reasons, 5 most notably because so many members of
the court could not agree on: (1) the ambiguousness of section
163(h); (2) the ambiguousness of the related legislative history;
and (3) how much weight to give I.R.C. § 163(h)'s legislative
assessment arose from the taxpayers' trade or business. See, e.g., Rose v.
Commissioner, 69 T.C.M. (CCH) 1914 (1995) (holding interest expense
incurred because the petitioner failed to pay income taxes on time); Tippin v.
Commissioner, 104 T.C. 518, 530 (1995)- (holding that "protection payments"
for a lien on unpaid income tax were not a deductible business interest
expense); Crouch v. Commissioner, 69 T.C.M. (CCH) 3038 (1995) (holding that
tax litigation expenses are not deductible business expenses, but can be
deducted as a miscellaneous itemized deduction). James E. Redlark was
engaged in the business of installing telephone equipment. Redlark, 141 F.3d
at 938. Redlark conducted his business as a sole-proprietor. Id. Following an
examination of several years' returns, the IRS proposed adjustments to
Redlark's business income and assessed additional income tax. Redlark, 106
T.C. at 32. Redlark paid the additional tax and deficiency interest and
proceeded to deduct the interest as a business expense. Id. The IRS
subsequently disallowed Redlark's business deduction for the deficiency
interest asserting that the interest was personal interest. Id. at 32-33.
56. Id. at 37. The adjustment related to errors made in converting
Redlark's business income from the accrual to cash basis for federal income
tax purposes. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 47. Temporary Regulation § 1.163-9T was promulgated pursuant
to its authority under I.R.C. § 7805(a) and not pursuant to a legislative
directive. Id. at 38. Regulations enacted pursuant to Treasury's general
rulemaking authority are referred to as "interpretive" regulations. Id.
Interpretive regulations are generally owed less deference than a regulation
issued pursuant to a specific grant of authority by Congress. Id. Rowan Cos.
v. United States, 452 U.S. 247, 253 (1981). Temporary Regulation § 1.163-9T
will be upheld only if it "implement[s] the congressional mandate [of section
163(h)] in some reasonable manner." United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co.,
455 U.S. 16, 24 (1982) (quoting United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 307
(1967)). See generally Vigil, supra note 41, at 688-90 (discussing various
explanations provided by the Tax Court in Redlark as to why Temporary
Regulation § 1.163-9T is an unreasonable interpretation of section 163(h)).
59. Redlark, 141 F.3d at 942. The court held that Temporary Regulation §
1.163-9T(b)(2)(i)(A) is a reasonable interpretation of I.R.C. § 163(h)(2). Id.
60. See Reynolds, supra note 11, at 753. (discussing the significance of
Redlark).
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history."1 The controversy intensified in the post-Redlark line of
cases where the Tax Court maintained its position that Temporary
Regulation § 1.163-9T was invalid, while the Federal appellate
courts took a contrary view.
C. The Aftermath of Redlark: Post-1996
Only one month before the Ninth Circuit reversed the Tax
Court's decision in Redlark, the Tax Court upheld its position on
the invalidity of Temporary Regulation § 1.163-9T and decided
Kikalos v. Commissioner6 2 in favor of the taxpayer. There was no
dispute that the interest paid by Kikalos on the tax deficiency was
a result of the operation of Kikalos' sole-proprietorship. 3 With
that premise, the Tax Court applied its reasoning in Redlark and
allowed the deficiency interest deduction because it was "properly
allocable to his trade or business."4
The Seventh Circuit ultimately reversed the Tax Court's
decision in Kikalos.65 The Seventh Circuit held that Temporary
Regulation § 1.163-9T was a reasonable interpretation of I.R.C. §
163(h) and therefore valid 6' despite the court's reluctance to give
Temporary Regulation § 1.163-9T the same degree of deference
that a final regulation would ordinarily be given.67
In addition to the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits, the
Fourth and Sixth Circuits recently joined the appellate courts'
unanimity in finding Temporary Regulation § 1.163-9T a valid

61. Id.
62. Kikalos v. Commissioner, 75 T.C.M. (CCH) 1924 (1998), rev'd, 190 F.3d
791 (7th Cir. 1999). Nick Kikalos operated a liquor store business as a soleproprietorship. Id. at 1925. Kikalos dealt substantially in cash and did not
retain cash register receipts for the years examined by the IRS. Id. The IRS

analyzed Kikalos' business income based on industry averages of the
percentage markup on the cost of goods sold by Kikalos. Id. at 1928. The IRS

concluded that Kikalos had underreported his business income and therefore
assessed additional tax and interest on the deficiency. Id. at 1927. Kikalos
subsequently deducted the deficiency interest as a business expense and the

IRS disallowed the deduction. Id.
63. Id. at 1933.
64. Id.
65. Kikalos, 190 F.3d at 799.

66. Id.
67. See id. at 796 (questioning the amount of scrutiny Temporary
Regulation § 1.163-9T has undergone in the past twelve years). The court
noted that "one could argue that section 1.163-9T(b)(2)(i)(A) is entitled to no
more deference than a proposed regulation." Id. The court stated in dicta that
Kikalos would have benefited if he argued that temporary regulations should
not be entitled to as much deference as final regulations. Id. However,

because Kikalos did not raise this issue, but instead, embraced the Tax Court's
view that the regulation was invalid, the court reserved for another day the
proper degree of deference that should be afforded temporary regulations
issued without prior notice and comment periods. Id. at 796.

The John MarshallLaw Review

[34:557

interpretation of I.R.C. § 163(h)."8 In addition, other federal
district courts have adopted the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in
Redlark and denied sole-proprietors a business deduction for
deficiency interest attributable to their trade or business.69
Taxpayers have endured a long history of conflicting
interpretations by the courts over the deductibility of noncorporate tax deficiency interest. 7° This issue will continue to
provide uncertain results for taxpayers until the Supreme Court
rules on the issue or legislative action is taken.7'
II.

CHALLENGING THE VALIDITY OF TEMPORARY REGULATION

§1.163-9T
Throughout the recent history of the deficiency interest
deduction dispute, taxpayers have had mixed success in
challenging the validity of Temporary Regulation § 1.163-9T. 2
This part of the Comment will examine both the taxpayers' and
the IRS' arguments regarding the deductibility of deficiency
interest and will examine the support for each position. First,
Section A will outline the central arguments raised by taxpayers
and the IRS. Next, Section B will examine the legislative history
of I.R.C. § 163(h) as a means to determine whether Congress
intended to retain a deduction for deficiency interest attributable
to a trade or business. With I.R.C. § 163(h)'s legislative history as
a backdrop, Section C will present the two forms of statutory
analysis used by the courts to determine whether or not I.R.C. §
163(h) is ambiguous. Lastly, Section D will analyze the distinction
between interpretive and legislative regulations and discuss the
amount of deference that the courts afford each.

68. See Allen v. United States, 173 F.3d 533, 534 (4th Cir. 1999), rev'g, 987

F.Supp. 460 (E.D.N.C. 1997) (finding Temporary Regulation § 1.163-9T to be a
reasonable construction of I.R.C. § 163(h)); McDonnell v. United States, 180
F.3d 721, 723 (6th Cir. 1999) (adopting the Ninth Circuit's analysis in Redlark
and holding that Temporary Regulation § 1.163-9T is a valid interpretation of
I.R.C. § 163(h)).
69. See, e.g., Stecher v. United States, 98-2 U.S.T.C.
50,543, at 85,236
(E.D. Colo. 1998) (holding that the taxpayers' tax deficiency interest was
personal interest in accordance with the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Redlark);
Kirk v. United States, 99-2 U.S.T.C.
50,687, at 89,277 (E.D. Ky. 1999)
(adopting the reasoning of the Fourth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits (Allen,
Miller, and Redlark, respectively) rejecting a business deduction for tax

deficiency interest); Davis v. United States, 99-2 U.S.T.C. 50,783, at 89,568
(W.D. Tex. 1999) (following the Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits
(Allen, McDonnell, Miller, and Redlark, respectively) denying a business

deduction for tax deficiency interest).
70. Richard I. Newmark & Ted D. Englebrecht, Courts Split on Individuals'
Deficiency Interest Deduction, 62 PRAC. TAX STRATEGIES 87, 87 (1999).

71. Id.
72. Id.
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A.

The Arguments

A flurry of challenges over the validity of Temporary
Regulation § 1.163-9T occurred when it was enacted in 1987. 73
When attempting to claim a business deduction for interest
incurred on federal income tax deficiencies, taxpayers have argued
that Temporary Regulation § 1. 163-9T is an invalid interpretation
of I.R.C. § 163(h).74 The basis for the argument is that I.R.C. §
163(h) is clear, and therefore Treasury did not have the authority
to issue regulations purporting to clarify that section.75
In contrast, the IRS argues that the regulation is a valid
interpretation of I.R.C. § 163(h) because the legislature had to
further clarify and define what is "properly allocable to a trade or
business."76 Surprisingly, both taxpayers and the IRS rely on the
legislative history of I.R.C. § 163(h) as support for their
arguments.77
B. Legislative History: Clarity or Confusion
When a court resorts to legislative history, it is generally to
resolve doubt, not create it.7 1 Unfortunately, when Congress
eliminated the deduction for personal interest in the Tax Reform
Act of 1986, neither I.R.C. § 163(h) nor its legislative history
clarified whether the exclusion applied to non-corporate tax

73. See, e.g., Miller v. United States, 95-1 U.S.T.C. II 50,068, at 87,228
(D.N.D. 1994); Redlark v. Commissioner, 106 T.C. 31, 33 (1996); Allen, 987
F.Supp. at 463; Kikalos v. Commissioner, 75 T.C.M. (CCH) 1924 (1998).
74. Newmark, supra note 70, at 93.
75. The dispute centers around the language in section 163(h)(2)(A) which
excludes from the category of "personal interest" interest paid or accrued on
debt "properly allocable to a trade or business." Redlark, 106 T.C. at 39.
Because Congress did not specifically grant to Treasury the authority to issue
regulations interpreting the meaning of "personal interest," Temporary
Regulation § 1.163-9T is an "interpretative regulation." Richard M. Lipton,
Divided Tax Court Allows Deduction of Interest on Tax Arising from a Trade or
Business, 84 J. TAX'N 218, 219 (1996).
The purpose of interpretative
regulations is to explain or clarify a statute enacted by Congress. See
generally supra note 15 and accompanying text.
76. Newmark, supra note 70, at 93.
77. Engel, supra note 11, at 262-63.
78. Caroline Elizabeth Costle, Judicial Deference to Interpretive
Regulations in the Face of Inconclusive Legislative History: The Example of
Nalle v. Commissioner, 47 TAx LAW. 259, 268 (1993) (quoting American
Community Builders, Inc. v. Commissioner, 301 F.2d 7, 13 (7th Cir. 1962)).
Justice Scalia equated legislative history with "entering a crowded cocktail
party and looking over the heads of the guests for one's friends." Id. at 259.
See also Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(quoting Judge Harold Leventhal). Justice Scalia used this metaphor to
illustrate the unreliability of legislative history because it will often contain
both supporting and non-supporting statements that permit the parties to pick
and choose material that supports their interpretation. Id.
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deficiency interest."9 This Section will discuss the two primary
sources of legislative history that courts have used to determine
the intent of Congress in enacting I.R.C. § 163(h).
1.

Conference Committee Report

The Conference Committee Report offers scarce support.
Both the taxpayers' argument and the IRS' argument rest on one
sentence in the Committee Report: "Personal interest also
generally includes interest on tax deficiencies." ° The heart of the
debate focuses on the word "generally." It appears that the word
"generally" was meant to exclude some forms of personal interest
from complete disallowance.8' The IRS, however, has argued that
the word "generally" was only meant to exclude interest paid on
past-due business taxes, such as sales and excise taxes, which are
specifically provided for in the regulations.82 The Tax Court
rejected the IRS' argument relying on the fact that "deficiency" has
a "long-established and well-known meaning."8
The word
"deficiency" has been held to include income, estate, and gift
taxes." Therefore, the court concluded that Congress must have
intended to exclude some forms of income, estate, and gift taxes
from the definition of personal interest." Accordingly, a logical
extension of the term "generally," in the context of the exception
clause of I.R.C. § 163(h)(2)(A), is that Congress intended to exclude
interest on tax deficiencies that are allocable to a trade or business
of the taxpayer.88
While the Committee Report may have offered little in the
way of concrete support for either party, the 1987 Bluebook was
79. Vigil, supra note 41, at 685-86.
80. H.R. CONF. :REP. No. 99-841, Vol. II, at 154 (1986), reprinted in 1986-3
C.B. 154 [hereinafter Committee Report]. The full text of the Committee

Report is as follows:
Under the conference agreement, personal interest is not deductible.
Personal interest is any interest, other than interest incurred or
continued in connection with the conduct of a trade or business (other
than the trade or business of performing services as a employee),
investment interest, or interest taken into account in computing the
taxpayer's income or loss from passive activities for the year. Personal
interest also generally includes interest on tax deficiencies.
Id. (emphasis added).
81. Reynolds, supra note 11, at 780.
82. Redlark, 106 T.C. at 44. See also Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-

9T(b)(2)(iii)(A) (1987) (excluding from the definition of personal interest,
interest paid on underpayments of "sales, excise, and similar taxes that are
incurred in connection with a trade or business").
83. Redlark, 106 T.C. at 44.

84. Id.
85. Id. at 45.
86. Id. The court further notes that adopting the IRS' position would
require the use of the word "always" instead of "generally" in the Committee
Report and require a more expansive definition of the term "deficiency." Id.
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explicitly clear.
2. General Explanationof the Tax Reform Act of 1986

('Bluebook")

The second illuminating piece of legislative history is the
1987 Bluebook issued by the Joint Tax Committee.87 The Bluebook
clearly supports the IRS' position that interest on income tax
deficiencies is not deductible.' However, the courts have refused
to acknowledge the Bluebook as a part of a statute's legislative
history because it is not prepared for the Congress that enacted a
particular statute.89 Furthermore, "[t]he Bluebook is on especially
weak ground when it adopts anti-taxpayer positions not taken in
the committee reports. "9° With this foundation, the majority in
Redlark disregarded the Bluebook as an indicator of congressional
intent. 91
The indeterminacy of I.R.C. § 163(h)'s legislative history
leaves neither the taxpayer nor the IRS with a superior argument.
Because the legislative history of I.R.C. § 163(h) adds little support
for upholding or rejecting Temporary Regulation § 1.163-9T, the
actual text of I.R.C. § 163(h) must be scrutinized.
C. Statutory Analysis
The next logical step toward determining congressional intent
is to analyze the text of I.R.C. § 163(h).92 A conclusion about the
87. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 100TH CONG., 1ST SESS.,
GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986 266 [hereinafter

Bluebook]. It is interesting to note that the Bluebook was issued more than
six months after the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
88. HARLLEE, supra note 22, at A-115. The Bluebook states in relevant
part:

Personal interest also includes interest on underpayments of individual
Federal, State or local income taxes notwithstanding that all or a
portion of the income may have arisen in a trade or business, because
such taxes are not considered derived from the conduct of a trade or
business. However, personal interest does not include interest payable
on estate tax deferred under sections 6163 or 6166.
Bluebook at 266 (footnote omitted).
89. Redlark, 106 T.C. at 45 n.7. See also Hutchinson v. Commissioner, 765
F.2d 665, 669-70 (1985) (stating that the Bluebook does not rise to the level of
legislative history because it was written by congressional staff and not by
Congress); Condor Int'l, Inc. v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 203, 227 (1992) (noting

that the Bluebook is not part of the legislative history of the statute it
explains).

90. Michael Livingston, What's Blue and White and Not Quite as Good as a
Committee Report: General Explanations and the Role of "Subsequent" Tax
Legislative History, 11 AM. J. TAX POLY 91, 93 (1994).

91. Redlark, 106 T.C. at 46.
92. See Ellen P. Aprill, Muffled Chevron: Judicial Review of Tax
Regulations, 3 FLA. TAX REV. 51, 54 (1996) (noting that the review of tax
regulations usually begins with the statutory text, although the interpretive
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clarity of I.R.C. § 163(h) will determine whether Temporary
There are generally two
Regulation § 1.163-9T is valid. 93
approaches used by the courts in determining the clarity of
statutory text: the Chevron approach and the "plain meaning"
approach.
1.

The Chevron Approach

The most common method used to determine a statute's
clarity was laid out by the court in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Counsel, Inc.94 The first step in the Chevron
approach is to use "traditional tools of statutory construction" and
legislative history to determine congressional intent." If Congress
has directly addressed the issue, the court must give effect to the
unambiguous intent of Congress and hold the regulation invalid.96
If, however, the court determines that the statute does not address
the question at issue, the court must determine whether the
regulation is based on a permissible construction of the statute.97
The Chevron approach, however, has not been strictly adopted in
tax cases. 98
In Redlark, for example, Judge Tannenwald began with an
examination of the text of I.R.C. § 163(h). 99 Based on the pre-Tax
Reform Act of 1986 case law, Judge Tannenwald stated that the

answer is rarely obvious).
93. Reynolds, supra note 11, at 774.
94. 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). See Aprill, supra note 92, at 54 (noting
that the Chevron standard has been applied in tax cases since 1989 and used
by the Tax Court since 1992).
95. Aprill, supra note 92, at 63-64 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9).
The Supreme Court stated:
First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to
the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is
the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however,
the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise
question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction
on the statute ....

Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with

respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the
agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
96. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
97. Before Chevron, the courts generally gave legislative regulations
"strong" deference and interpretive regulations "weak" deference. Aprill,
supra note 92, at 57. Interpretive regulations would be upheld as long as they
"implemented the congressional mandate in some reasonable manner." Id. at
58. See id. at 58 (discussing the Supreme Court's explanation in Nat'l Muffler
Dealers Ass'n v. U.S., 440 U.S 472 (1979)). See also id. at 57-61 (discussing the
pre-Chevron deference afforded interpretive regulations).
98. See generally Aprill, supra note 92, at 66-67 (discussing the Tax Court's
reformulated application of the Chevron standard).
99. Redlark, 106 T.C. at 39 (1996).
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language of I.R.C. § 163(h) was sufficient for Redlark to prevail. °°
However, Judge Tannenwald went on to consider I.R.C. § 163(h)'s
legislative history.1"' Judge Tannenwald's examination of I.R.C. §
163(h)'s legislative history departed from traditional Chevron
analysis where legislative history is used only at the first step in
determining whether Congress has addressed the particular
question at issue." 2 The Tax Court's departure from traditional
Chevron analysis is representative of the gradual shift in tax cases
towards the use of the plain meaning approach."3
2.

The "PlainMeaning"Approach

While the plain meaning approach is not embraced by a
majority of the Supreme Court,' its use has increasingly been
used in statutory interpretation cases. 0 ' The plain meaning
approach looks at the words used in the statute itself, rather than
the congressional intent or purpose inherent in the legislative
history. 1 6 A statute's language is analyzed based on its dictionary
definitions, rules of textual construction and the way a specific
provision relates to the statute as a whole.' 7
Unfortunately, the plain meaning approach does not provide a
workable standard for reviewing statutory text. 108 The courts
continue to inconsistently apply the plain meaning approach to
statutory interpretation.' 9 This inconsistent application of the

100. Id.
101. Id.
102. But see Aprill, supra note 92, at 81-82 (denoting this standard of
reviewing statutory text as the "muffled" Chevron doctrine). The muffled
Chevron doctrine is a combination of the standards espoused by the Supreme
Court in National Muffler and Chevron. Id. at 82.
103. See, e.g., Redlark, 106 T.C. at 48, 54-55 (illustrating the Tax Court's
move towards a more textualist approach to reviewing the Code). Judges
Swift and Laro would have both held Temporary Regulation § 1.163-9T invalid
based solely on the statutory language. Id. Judge Swift was of the opinion
that I.R.C. § 163(h) '[spoke] for itself." Id. at 48. Judge Laro was also of the
opinion that the statute spoke for itself and felt that "legislative history should
be sought to embellish the text only when the meaning of the words therein
are 'inescapably ambiguous'." Id. at 54-55.
104. See Aprill, supra note 92, at 65 (noting that Justice Scalia espouses the
strict-construction approach to interpreting statutory text).
105. Mary L. Heen, Plain Meaning, The Tax Code, and Doctrinal
Incoherence, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 771, 771-73 (1997). See also Aprill, supra note
92, at 64-65 (noting that Justice Scalia has changed the Chevron approach to
fit with his textualist theory of interpretation).
106. Id. at 771-72. See, e.g., Aprill, supra note 92, at 65 (discussing Justice
Scalia's attack on the use of legislative history as a tool of statutory
construction).
107. Heen, supra note 105, at 773.
108. See id. at 811-12 (discussing the Supreme Court's inconsistent approach
to interpreting statutory text).
109. See id. at 812 (noting that the Court applied the plain meaning
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plain meaning approach could lead to disjointed and inconsistent
interpretations of the Code."'
Because of the confusion among the courts, and specifically
the Supreme Court, over the proper standard to apply in analyzing
statutory text, an argument that Temporary Regulation § 1. 163-9T
is invalid because the text of I.R.C. § 163(h) is unambiguous may
be futile. Even if it is assumed that I.R.C. § 163(h) is ambiguous,
the question of judicial deference to regulations that purport to
interpret congressional intent must be considered.
D. Interpretive vs. Legislative Regulations:A Blurred Distinction
Administrative law recognizes two types of regulations:
legislative and interpretive."' A legislative regulation is similar in
weight to a statute."' Legislative regulations create "legally
enforceable duties" that are binding on the agency promulgating
the regulation, the courts, and private parties."' An interpretive
regulation, by contrast, does not create new duties."" Interpretive
regulations merely interpret or clarify a dispute created by the
The distinction between
passage of a particular statute."'
legislative and interpretive regulations is especially important in
the context of judicial review of tax regulations and public
involvement in adopting tax regulations." 6
approach to a statute three years after it had chosen not to).
110. Id. Even if the plain meaning approach were applied consistently by

the courts, inherent limitations in its application would continue. Id. The
plain meaning approach would restrict important contextual information,
eliminate the use of legislative history, and pose a risk of misinterpretation in
tax cases. Id.
111. Aprill, supra note 92, at 55.
112. Id.
113. RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 285

(The Foundation Press, Inc., 2d ed. 1992). In the tax context, Treasury adopts
legislative rules pursuant to a specific grant of rulemaking authority.
Asimow, supra note 15, at 358.
114. PIERCE, supra note 113, at 285.

Interpretive tax regulations are

adopted pursuant to the Treasury Department's general rulemaking power in
I.R.C. § 7805(a). Asimow, supra note 15, at 358. Regulations adopted under

I.R.C. § 7805(a) are almost uniformly classified as interpretive by tax
authorities. Id.
115. PIERCE, supra note 113, at 285. But see Anthony, supra note 18, at 10
(defining "spurious rules" as interpretive regulations that have the appearance

of law by the agency promulgating the regulation and the courts enforcing the
regulation); Toni Robinson, Retroactivity: The Case for Better Regulation of
Federal Tax Regulators, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 773, n.60 (1987) (discussing the view
of one commentator who believes that interpretive tax regulations are nothing

more than "creative law making").
116. Asimow, supra note 15, at 351. See generally Peter A. Appel,
Administrative Procedure and the Internal Revenue Service: Delimiting the
Substantial Understatement Penalty, 98 YALE L.J. 1435, 1442-46 (1989)

(discussing the history of the distinction between legislative and interpretive
rules).
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JudicialReview of Interpretive Tax Regulations

Historically, the courts have given greater deference to
legislative regulations than interpretive regulations. 17 However,
in the tax context, this rule has become more pragmatic than
real."8 Currently, the general rule for reviewing interpretive tax
regulations is that the courts should defer to Treasury's
interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code as long as the
interpretation is reasonable." 9
However, courts have not
consistently applied this general rule.
In Redlark, the Tax Court gave Temporary Regulation §
1.163-9T less deference than a legislative regulation because it
was interpretive. 2 ' This lesser deference allowed the Tax Court to
find that Temporary Regulation § 1.163-9T was an impermissible
interpretation of I.R.C. § 163(h).121 On appeal, however, the Ninth
Circuit reversed the Tax Court, languidly giving
full deference to
22
Treasury's interpretation of I.R.C. § 163(h)
When the courts presume the validity of the Treasury
regulations, it raises serious concerns over Treasury's ability to
establish substantive law without public involvement and with
minimal judicial interference. 22
2. EnactingInterpretive Tax Regulations
The Administrative Procedure Act generally requires a
federal agency to provide public notice of proposed rules in the
Federal Register.2 1 When notice is published in the Federal
Register, the public is given the opportunity to participate in the

117. Aprill, supra note 92, at 57.
118. Id. at 58.

119. Cottage Say. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 499 U.S. 554, 560-61 (1991). An
interpretation will be considered reasonable if the regulation "harmonizes

with the plain language of the statute, its origins, and its purpose." Costle,
supra note 78, at 264 (quoting National Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United
States, 440 U.S. 472, 477 (1979)).
120. Redlark v. Commissioner, 106 T.C. 31, 38 (1996).

121. Id. at 47. In dicta, Judge Tannenwald stated that he did not think that
"the Secretary of the Treasury should be entitled to use ... section 7805(a) to
construct a formula which excludes an entire category of interest expense in

disregard of a business connection such as exists herein." Id. at 40.
122. Redlark v. Commissioner, 141 F.3d 936, 939 (1998). The court stated:
"So long as the Commissioner issues regulations that 'implement the
congressional mandate in some reasonable manner,' we must defer to the
Commissioner's interpretation." Id. (citing Rowan Cos. V. United States, 452
U.S. 247, 252 (1981)).
123. See Asimow, supra note 15, at 366 (suggesting that when agencies
make new law without public involvement, the agency eliminates any direct
accountability to the voters and that a democratic system of government
requires that the people who will be governed by the laws have some say about
their scope).
124. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1994).
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rulemaking process, and the agency is required to consider any

information presented by the public before making the regulation
final.'25 However, the Administrative Procedure Act provides an
exception to the public notice and comment period requirements
for agencies proposing rules that are "interpretative."2 6
Treasury enacted Temporary Regulation § 1.163-9T pursuant
to its authority under I.R.C. § 7805.127 Because regulations
enacted under I.R.C. § 7805 are uniformly considered interpretive
rules, 12 8 Temporary Regulation § 1.163-9T was not subject to the
pre-adoption public notice and comment period requirements of
the Administrative Procedure Act. This lack of public involvement
in enacting interpretive regulations, coupled with the high degree
of judicial deference to those regulations, goes beyond the mere
interpretation of a statute."9
That practice gives Treasury the
unbridled power to enact binding rules that have the force and
effect of law in the courts and on taxpayers. This practice is
exemplified by Treasury's narrow construction of I.R.C. § 163(h),
which excludes an "entire category of interest expense.""'
Treasury's failure to provide pre-adoption public notice and a
comment period for an overreaching regulation like Temporary
Regulation § 1. 163-9T raises significant concerns over the power of
a federal agency to act in a legislative capacity."1'
125. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c).
126. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A). See also supra note 19 and accompanying text
(discussing exceptions to the notice and comment period requirements of the
Administrative Procedure Act). The Administrative Procedure Act refers to
Both words are
"interpretative" rules rather than "interpretive" rules.
commonly used and used interchangeably. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown,
441 U.S. 281, 301, 313 (1979). For purposes of this Comment, the author
prefers to use the word "interpretive" for stylistic reasons. It is interesting to
note that a Senate version of the Omnibus Taxpayers' Bill of Rights Act would
have repealed the interpretive rule exception to the Administrative Procedure
S. 604, 100th Cong. § 17(a) (1987).
Act for Treasury regulations.
Furthermore, a later Senate version of the Omnibus Taxpayers' Bill of Rights
Act would have required the Secretary of the Treasury to certify that a rule
proposed by the Internal Revenue Service is the only alternative to meet the
mandate of a particular statute before it will be considered an interpretive
rule for purposes of the Administrative Procedure Act. S. 1774, 100th Cong. §
8(a) (1987).
127. T.D. 8168, 1988-1 C.B. 80, 83.
128. Asimow, supra note 15, at 358.
129. As Judge Laro clearly illustrated:
If the Congress had intended to disallow any deduction for deficiency
interest that was an ordinary and necessary business expense under
section 162(a), the Congress would have said so. Instead, the Congress
clearly stated that personal interest does not include 'interest paid or
accrued on indebtedness properly allocable to a trade or business.'
Redlark, 106 T.C. at 57 (Laro, J. concurring).
130. Redlark v. Commissioner, 106 T.C. at 40.
131. See Asimow, supra note 15, at 343 (questioning whether the Treasury
Department's practice of promulgating rules that are not subject to the
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III. ENDING THE DEFICIENCY INTEREST DEDUCTION CONTROVERSY
To challenge the validity of Temporary Regulation § 1.163-9T,
one must do more than simply attack the amount of deference
given to the regulation by the courts, or claim that Treasury did
not have authority to issue the regulation in the first place. An
effective argument to invalidate Temporary Regulation § 1. 163-9T
must concede Treasury's authority to issue the regulation (given
the recent weight of authority) and argue that Temporary
Regulation § 1.163-9T is invalid because 3it2 was enacted in

violation of the Administrative Procedure Act.

Section A proposes that interpretive regulations may be
legislative in effect.
Temporary Regulation § 1.163-9T is
legislative in effect and therefore should not fall within the
interpretive rule exception to the Administrative Procedure Act. A
regulation that is legislative in effect should be subject to the same
pre-adoption public notice and comment period requirements that
legislative regulations are subject.'33 Temporary Regulation §
1.163-9T did not comply with the pre-adoption public notice and
comment period requirements of the Administrative Procedure
Act, and therefore should be held invalid."4
Section B proposes that Congress eliminate the interpretive
rule exception to the Administrative Procedure Act."' This would
Administrative Procedure Act is good policy).
132. Very few tax cases have considered whether Treasury has complied
with the public notice and comment period requirements of the Administrative
Procedure Act in its rulemaking process. Asimow, supra note 15, at 359. See,
e.g., American Standard, Inc. v. United States, 602 F.2d 256, 268 (Ct. Cl. 1979)
(invalidating a legislative regulation because of improper public notice under
the Administrative Procedure Act). Even fewer tax cases have examined the
applicability of the interpretive rule exception to the Administrative Procedure
Act. Asimow, supra note 15, at 359. See, e.g., American Med. Ass'n v. United
States, 688 F. Supp. 358, 364 (N.D. Ill. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 887 F.2d
760 (7th Cir. 1989) (stating that the regulation at issue, which was adopted
under I.R.C. § 7805(a), was legislative and therefore did not fall within the
interpretive rule exception to public notice and comment period requirements
of the Administrative Procedure Act).
The district court stated that
"regulations that define or give substantive content to language undefined
with any real specificity in the Code (hence being 'legislative' in the legalrealism sense that recognizes administrative agencies as potential
lawmakers)" are legislative. Id.
133. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (discussing the notice and
comment period requirements in the adoption of federal agency regulations).
134. Cf. Kikalos v. Commissioner, 190 F.3d 791, 796 (1999) (hypothesizing
that temporary regulations that are not subject to pre-adoption notice and
comment periods may not be entitled to any more deference than a proposed
regulation). See also Costle, supra note 78, at 277 (arguing that the courts
should give interpretive regulations less deference).
135. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (discussing the interpretive
rule exception to the Administrative Procedure Act). See also supra note 126
and accompanying text (illustrating recent attempts to eliminate the
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ensure that future rules promulgated by Treasury would be
subject to a pre-adoption public notice and comment period, which
will have the effect of diluting Treasury's delegated authority and
furthering the government's general rulemaking policy.'
A. Interpretive Regulations with Legislative Effect
Regulations denoted as interpretive by Treasury, such as
Temporary Regulation § 1.163-9T, enjoy a presumption of validity
by the courts.3 7 A judicial presumption that interpretive Treasury
regulations are valid necessarily implies that Treasury may
establish rules having the same "force and effect of law" as
legislative regulations.138 Consequently, because the legal effect of
interpretive regulations and legislative regulations is the same,
both types of regulations should be subjected to the same preadoption procedures.13 '
Accordingly, the first step toward
subjecting all Treasury regulations to the same pre-adoption
procedures is to eliminate the Administrative Procedure Act's
interpretive rule exception.
B. Eliminatingthe Interpretive Rule Exception
Regulations with legislative effect should not be exempted
from pre-adoption public participation merely because Treasury
attaches an "interpretive" label on its face."' ° Permitting the
adoption of Treasury regulations without pre-adoption public
participation undermines United States rulemaking policy, which
advocates public involvement in the rulemaking process by the
people destined to be governed by those laws."" In order to

interpretive rule exception).
136. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (stating Congress' declaration
of United States rulemaking policy).
137. See supra notes 117-23 and accompanying text (discussing the amount
of deference given to interpretive Treasury regulations by the courts).
138. See Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425 n.9 (1977) (deciding that
administrative interpretations of statutory terms may have legislative effect).
The Supreme Court further stated:
[Tihe Secretary [of the treasury], rather than.. .the courts, [have] the
primary responsibility for interpreting the statutory term. In exercising
that responsibility, the Secretary adopts regulations with legislative
effect. A reviewing court is not free to set aside those regulations simply
because it would have interpreted the statute in a different manner.
Id. at 425.
139. See Asimow, supra note 15, at 359-60 (arguing that all regulations
issued by Treasury should be treated as legislative and subject to the public
participation requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act).
140. See Chamber of Commerce v. OSHA, 636 F.2d 464, 468 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(stating that an "interpretive" label is indicative but not dispositive of the type
of regulation at issue). The real inquiry is what is the substance of the
regulation. Id.
141. See id. at 470 (rejecting an OSHA regulation for failure to comply with
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advance United States rulemaking policy, the interpretive rule
exception of the Administrative Procedure Act should be
eliminated.
Furthermore, it is unlikely that either Congress or the courts
Will establish a bright-line test to distinguish between legislative
rules, interpretive rules, and interpretive rules with legislative
effect.1 4 2 If the interpretive rule exception is eliminated, there will
be uniformity in the enactment of Treasury regulations, thereby
eliminating questions over the proper amount of judicial deference
that should be afforded a particular regulation.
CONCLUSION

It is questionable whether the specific classification of all
interest as personal interest on individual federal income tax
deficiencies in Temporary Regulation § 1.163-9T was necessary to
the enforcement of I.R.C. § 163(h). If anything, the limitation is
an additional restriction on the deductibility of interest in a trade
or business context, and one that was not specifically considered
by Congress.
Consequently, future taxpayer challenges to Temporary
Regulation § 1.163-9T should be premised on the fact that strong
judicial deference to interpretive regulations necessitates public
involvement in enacting those regulations.
Without public
participation, taxpayers are rendered powerless against Treasury's
lawmaking ability.4 3 When taxpayers lack the proper degree of
influence over the content of Treasury regulations, Treasury is
effectively placed in a tyrannical position that enables it to alter
congressional intent as it sees fit. When this occurs, Treasury has
clearly gone too far.

the Administrative Procedure Act because it was an attempted exercise of
legislative power).
142. See Appel, supra note 116, at 1444 (noting that the distinction between
interpretive and legislative regulations remains unclear).

143. See Asimow, supra note 15, at 366 (commenting that public notice and
comment periods "serve fundamental democratic purposes."). By not allowing
public participation in the adoption of agency regulations an agency can make
new law without direct accountability to the public. Id. Agency regulations
should not be effective until after the democratic process of public involvement
has occurred. Id.

